The reason that $\sf ZFC$ cannot prove that there is an inaccessible cardinal, or a measurable cardinal, or any other of the many large cardinal axioms of this sort, is Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.
Namely, if $\kappa$ is an inaccessible cardinal, then $V_\kappa$ is a model of $\sf ZFC$, in which case, in that particular set theoretic universe, the statement "$\sf ZFC$ is consistent" is true.
If $\sf ZFC$ can prove the existence of an inaccessible cardinal, then in all of its models the statement "$\sf ZFC$ is consistent" holds, and therefore $\sf ZFC$ can actually prove "$\sf ZFC$ is consistent". But according to Gödel's second incompleteness theorem this cannot possibly happen with a theory that is recursively axiomatisable (which $\sf ZFC$ certainly is), interprets basic arithmetic (which $\sf ZFC$ most certainly does), and consistent.
So, this obstacle does not allow us to prove the existence of inaccessible cardinals. But to argue, philosophically, that this must mean that $\sf ZFC$ must be inconsistent, is just one small step from claiming that because $\sf ZFC$ can prove that $\sf PA$ is consistent, while $\sf PA$ itself cannot must mean that $\sf PA$ is inconsistent as well, and this argument goes well into "very reasonable theories" that hardly anyone in mathematics would think are inconsistent.
Instead, this is understood as giving a proper mathematical (and philosophical) strength to a mathematical theory. Namely, $\sf ZFC$ is a stronger theory than $\sf PA$ since it proves its consistency. $\sf ZFC$ + "There exists an inaccessible cardinal" is a stronger theory than $\sf ZFC$". And so on. This is what we mean when we say that large cardinal axioms provide us with a measuring stick for the strength of mathematical statements.
Now, back to the question at hand. If $\kappa$ is a measurable cardinal, not only that $\kappa$ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal, it is also Mahlo, greatly Mahlo, weakly compact, and much much more. So the theory $\sf ZFC$+"There exists a measurable cardinal" is significantly stronger than all of those, which themselves are already strong. But this is not close enough to showing that $\sf ZFC$ refutes their existence, and while this still might be the case, all of the arguments that were proposed this far tend to be based on some severe misunderstanding of how large cardinal axioms work, how the measuring stick work, and what does it mean for a theory to prove or refute a large cardinal axiom.