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From the current Wikipedia article on conservative extensions, it states:

an extension $T_2$ of a theory $T_1$ is model-theoretically conservative if $T_1\subseteq T_2$ and every model of $T_1$ can be expanded to a model of $T_2$.

But presume it really means this:

an extension $T_2$ of a theory $T_1$ is model-theoretically conservative if $T_1\subseteq T_2$ and every set model of $T_1$ can be expanded to a set model of $T_2$.

I added the word "set" in bold. But I know we can model using something other than sets, like classes. Is there a theorem that says our notion of model-theoretic extension isn't dependant on whether we are talking about class models set models or something else?

I am aware that soundness and completeness guarantee our notion of deduction agrees with set models; that for every consistent theory we are guaranteed we have a set model of it. Is there a parallel theorem that says we don't limit our notion of conservative extension by only focussing on set models?

1 Answers1

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Short version

No, there isn't! "$T$ is model-theoretically-conservative over $S$" is a $\Pi_2$ property, and in general (and in this specific case) analysis of such properties and their approximations land us squarely in the realm of large cardinals.

Longer version:


Preliminaries

As stated, this question requires a background metatheory which is rich enough to directly talk about proper class sized "structures." However, $\mathsf{ZFC}$ is not rich enough to do this directly, and once we do move to such a metatheory there's no real difference between the set/class distinction and the size-$<\kappa$/size-$\kappa$ distinction for a "reasonably closed" cardinal $\kappa$. So to keep things simple, I'm going to modify the question to be about how notions of model-theoretic conservativity vary as we allow larger and larger models.

This is certainly a reasonable thing to worry about! For instance, let $T$ be a (complete, no finite models, finite language) countably categorical theory which is not uncountably categorical. Then the theory $T'$ describing a pair of models of $T$ and the theory $T^\star$ which expands $T'$ by adding an isomorphism between the two models of $T$ are related in the following way: every countable model of $T'$ can be expanded to a model of $T^\star$, but not every uncountable model of $T'$ can be so expanded. This motivates the following definition, which is not standard terminology:

Suppose $A\subseteq B$ are deductively closed theories and $\kappa$ is a a cardinal. Say that $B$ is a $\kappa$-MTC extension of $A$ iff every model of $A$ of size $<\kappa$ can be expaned to a model of $B$.

(The "$<\kappa$" where you may expect a "$\le \kappa$" is a common set-theoretic subtlety; think about e.g. $\aleph_\omega$-MTC vs. $\aleph_{\omega+1}$-MTC. This is a very minor point, though, so feel free to ignore it.) The example above shows that we can have an $\aleph_1$-MTC extension which is not an $\aleph_2$-MTC extension. On the other hand, Morley's theorem - that a countable theory categorical in some uncountable cardinality is categorical in every uncountable cardinality - makes it tricky to push this higher, especially if we avoid large languages. So you might expect only "small" cardinals to be relevant to model-theoretic conservation.


Hehehehe ...

As it turns out, though, the situation is much nastier than that. Let's take the theory $\mathsf{ZFC}$ itself, and consider the theory $T$ (in the language gotten by adding to the language of set theory a unary relation symbol $U$) which adds to $\mathsf{ZFC}$ the single axiom $$\exists xU(x)\wedge\forall y\exists z(U(y)\rightarrow U(z)\wedge z\in y).$$ Then $T$ is a model-theoretically-conservative extension of $\mathsf{ZFC}$ iff $\mathsf{ZFC}$ has no well-founded model.

But we can make this even worse! We could replace the sentence above with the disjunction of that sentence and (allowing some abbreviation) $$\exists x(U\subseteq x\wedge \forall y(U\not=y)).$$ Call the result $S$. Then $S$ is a model-theoretically-conservative extension of $\mathsf{ZFC}$ iff there are no well-founded models of $\mathsf{ZFC}$ which are correct about powerset, i.e. worldly cardinals. And we can continue well up the large cardinal hierarchy:

Let $\lambda$ be the least measurable cardinal. Then there is a pair of countable theories $T\subseteq S$ such that $S$ is a $\lambda$-MTC extension of $T$ but $S$ is not a $\lambda^+$-MTC extesnion of $T$.

And this really uses nothing special about measurability, simply the fact that "$\lambda$ is measurable" is "detected" in the cumulative hierarchy not too high above $\lambda$ (= in $V_{\lambda+2}$). At a glance, the upper bound on this phenomenon - the point where MTC-ness up to that point is equivalent to full model-theoretic-conservativity - is a strongly compact cardinal. Which is bonkers gigantic (and also arises if we ask similar questions where the domain of the universe, rather than the language, is extended - see here)! It also helps us understand the analogue of this question for logics other than FOL (where the proof-theoretic notion of conservativity may break down but $\kappa$-MTC-ness is still a priori meaningful): Makowsky proved that Vopenka's principle guarantees (and is equivalent to) having the analogues of strongly compact cardinals for "every" logic (e.g. the second-order analogue of a strongly compact is an extendible cardinal), so VP is in a sense the axiom that says that MTC-ness is "bounded" for every logic.

Noah Schweber
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  • So sets can't capture everything about model-theoretic conservative extensions. But we can capture more by adding larger cardinals to our definition of a model? I already know that set theoretic conservative extensions are a strict subset of proof theoretic conservative extensions, and now I get using a different notion of model expands what model-theoretic conservative extensions can do. Is there some space where we could expand it so much that model-theoretic and proof-theoretic conservative extensions coincide? Maybe I should ask this as a separate question. Related to... – Pineapple Fish Sep 01 '24 at 22:55
  • (cont.) this question https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/4963002/an-example-of-a-proof-theoretic-conservative-extension-thats-not-a-model-theore – Pineapple Fish Sep 01 '24 at 22:55
  • Hang on, I'm assuming that extensions which are set-model theoretically conservative are a subset those that are conservative under large cardinal models. Could there be an extension which is (set) model-theoretically conservative but not model-theoretically conservative when allowing models with large cardinals? – Pineapple Fish Sep 01 '24 at 23:12