In Lagrange's theorem one must start with a group $G$ and subgoup $H$.
Let us say instead, sets $H \subset G$ with a binary operation inherited from $G$. Then say we would like the sets to be partionable into distinct cosets under the natural binary coset operation $gH$ where $g \in G$. The fact that they are distinct will force (motivate) an identity, associativity, and inverses via cancellation as follows: If $x$ $\in g_1H$ $\cap g_2H$ $\rightarrow x = g_1h_1 = g_2h_2$ The process of showing $g_1H \subset g_2H$ gives, showing containment in one direction by assuming $g' \in g_1H$ or $g' = g_1h'$ for some $h' \in H$
The point here: we must use associativity inverses and identity to solve and get $g_1=g_2h_2h_1^{-1}$ in a natural or normal way. These are exactly what we need for the definition of a group! This is why I think Group Theory could start with Lagrange's theorem as a motivator for the definition of a group. We could say that "If this is to work then the group properties are exactly what we need."
Can you show that this fails to force the definition of a group in any way? Is this logically adequate to create the definition of a group starting with cosets (as equivalence classes)? Can you get to distinct cosets without forcing the cancellation process to work? Please explain.