Well. In order to establish "true independence" you need to show that $\sf ZFC$ is consistent with both the statement and its negation, at least assuming that $\sf ZFC$ is consistent.
However just assuming that $\sf ZFC$ is consistent is not enough to establish that $\sf ZFC$+large cardinal axioms are consistent, because from large cardinal axioms we can prove the consistency of $\sf ZFC$; thus a proof of consistency from $\sf ZFC$ of large cardinal axioms will ultimately prove the consistency of $\sf ZFC$, and by the second incompleteness theorem this is impossible.
So you can only prove that $\sf ZFC$ does not prove the existence of large cardinals, not that it does not refute them.
And indeed every now and then you can find people claiming to have proofs that inaccessible cardinals are inconsistent with $\sf ZFC$.
(The situation is similar with $\sf ZFC+\operatorname{Con}(ZFC)$, which is also strictly stronger than just $\sf ZFC$ in terms of consistency. But I don't think anyone who seriously considers $\sf ZFC$ a reasonable theory thinks it is inconsistent, so this assumption gets questioned far less often than inaccessible cardinals.)
Caveat lector:
Relative consistency results about $\sf ZFC$ and assumptions stronger than $\sf ZFC$ itself will depend a lot on the meta-theory. If you work in a theory which assumes $\sf\operatorname{Con}(ZFC)+\lnot\operatorname{Con}(ZFC+LC)$, then $\sf ZFC$ will refute large cardinals in that meta-theory. Because there will be a "natural number" encoding a proof of contradiction in a way recognizable by $\sf ZFC$.
The point is that when you want to talk about the ability to refute something stronger than $\sf ZFC$ you need to ask yourself what sort of meta-theory you have. If inaccessible cardinals are refutable from $\sf ZFC$, that's great (or actually the other thing, sucky); if not, then the question if they are refutable becomes meta-theory dependent.