In the Church-Turing thesis Wiki page, there are a set of descriptions of the "behavior of a computor—`a human computing agent who proceeds mechanically'". I am content with all of them, except:
(L.2) (Locality) A computor can shift attention from one symbolic configuration to another one, but the new observed configurations must be within a bounded distance of the immediately previously observed configuration.
I suppose this is related to the fact that in the standard description of a Turing machine, we are only allowed to move one step left or one step right at any step of the computation (e.g. the transition function is a map t : Symbols x States -> Symbols x States x {L,R}).
Indeed, this finiteness/locality assumption is present in Turing's original paper: in Section 9, Turing writes:
Besides these changes of symbols, the simple operations must include changes of distribution of observed squares. The new observed squares must be immediately recognisable by the computer. I think it is reasonable to suppose that they can only be squares whose distance from the closest of the immediately previously observed squares does not exceed a certain fixed amount. Let us say that each of the new observed squares is within L squares of an immediately previously observed square.
My issue with this is that I don't think it matches the standard motivating intuition provided for Turing machines (Turing himself provided this motivating picture in his original paper), namely that of some person, working with a finite set of symbols (e.g. all the symbols we can produce on a keyboard say), and finitely many "states of mind", reading/writing/erasing symbols on an unlimited pile of paper. I think it's entirely reasonable for that person, to flip an arbitrarily large number of pages forward or back in the pile/sequence of papers. Of course, if I wanted to flip a million pages back, I could! Or if I wanted to flip a trillion pages forward, I could!
Well, indeed in the standard model of Turing machines, I can have some sort of counter-variable holding the value of a million or trillion, and then take one step left or right, decrementing the counter-variable each time. So in this way, an unlimited number of steps left or right can be interpreted as just one step left or right, but over the course of many "units" of time.
But if truly unlimited numbers of steps left and right can be simulated by a standard Turing machine, why even bother stating this finiteness/locality "axiom"? I am having trouble understanding the subtlety of what sorts of "unlimited steps" left or right the "axiom" forbids, and what sorts of "unlimited steps" left or right the "axiom" allows (e.g. my "one trillion steps" example above).
EDIT: see also Intuition for Church-Turing thesis for Turing machines which says
The Church-Turing thesis says that any physically realizable computation does not require any "essentially nonlocal" operations.
I guess my above question is basically asking for a more precise understanding of what "locality" means. Fun bonus trivia: https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/402934/why-do-we-believe-the-church-turing-thesis mentions spacetime structures consistent with General Relativity which in some sense allow infinite computation in finite time!