No, message commitment by disclosing its HMAC-MD5 with a key later revealed is no longer any secure, because of the ease with which MD5 collisions can now be found. There's however no compelling evidence that's insecure for messages constrained to belong in a small arbitrary set that no adversary can choose or influence. Still, whatever the constraints on the messages, the narrow 128-bit output width of HMAC-MD5 allows an attack with a relatively modest (and clearly feasible) $2^{65}$ evaluations of HMAC-MD5.
HMAC builds a PRF from a hash function $H$ with
Merkle-Damgård structure, message block width $w$ and output width $h$,
with $w\ge h$, as
$$\operatorname{HMAC}_H(K,m)=\begin{cases}
H\Big((K\oplus\text{opad})\mathbin\|H\big((K\oplus\text{ipad})\mathbin\|m\big)\Big) &\text{if $|K|\le w$}\\
\operatorname{HMAC}_H\big(H(K),m\big) &\text{if $|K|>w$}
\end{cases}$$
where $\text{opad}$ (resp. $\text{ipad}$) is the 0x5c5c5c… (resp. 0x363636…)
pattern with width $w$, and $\oplus$ is bitwise exclusive-OR with the
shortest operand right-padded using zero bits.
If the compression function used to build $H$ has suitable properties,
then for random unknown $K$ with $|K|\ge h$, the function $m\mapsto
\operatorname{HMAC}_H(K,m)$ is indistinguishable from random with
effort less than about $2^h$ evaluations of $H$. We have no compelling evidence that this does not hold for $H=\operatorname{MD5}$ (for which $h=128$, $w=512$). For more details see Mihir Bellare, New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security without Collision Resistance, in Journal of Cryptology, 2015 (originally in proceedings of Crypto 2006).
When $H$ is MD5, or any $H$ that is not collision-resistant, the attack in the question renders insecure a commitment protocol where Alice
- secretly chooses $m$ and $K$
- computes and publishes $\operatorname{HMAC}_H(K,m)$ as a commitment of $m$
- performs some action dependent on $m$ (like: offer a bet about the first bit of $m$)
- later reveals $m$
- reveals $K$, allowing a verifier to compute $\operatorname{HMAC}_H(K,m)$ on the $m$ Alice alleges, and compare against Alice's commitment.
Notice however that even with an ideal $H$, there's an attack with effort about $2^{h/2}$ evaluations of $H$, where Alice finds $m$ and $m'$ with $H\big((K\oplus\text{ipad})\mathbin\|m\big)=H\big((K\oplus\text{ipad})\mathbin\|m'\big)$; thus the mere output size of HMAC-MD5 limits its security level to a modest $2^{64}$ evaluations of MD5, in this protocol where $m$ is unconstrained.
On the other hand, I see no attack (much better than brute force on $K$) on the use of HMAC-MD5 (or HMAC with a non-collision-resistant $H$) in the variant of this protocol where Alice is constrained to choose $m$ in a small arbitrary set that no adversary can choose or influence, like $\{\text{“stone”},\text{“paper”},\text{“scissors”}\}$, as considered in the suggestion referenced in the question. Alice has so little choice on the messages that she must be clever in her choice of $K$, rather than $m$, in order to cause a collision. My intuition is that because $K$ enters twice in the computation of $\operatorname{HMAC}_H(K,m)$, with at least one execution of the compression function in-between (for heavily constrained $m$), finding a theoretical shortcut would be extremely hard, well beyond what the current cryptanalysis status of MD5 allows.
